Quantitative Techniques for Competition and Antitrust Analysis Peter Davis, Eliana Garces
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Sep 17, 2013 - The Intensive Course on Quantitative Methods for Competition Analysis will provide participants (economists, lawyers and practitioners working for firms or in agencies) with a thorough understanding of recent empirical methods to economic journals, and his book, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2004), is the standard international reference on the economics of antitrust, and is used by teachers, scholars, and practitioners. Feb 1, 2001 - Among the topics covered are consumer choice, welfare effects of government policy, production technology, profitability, competitive market analysis, and market power and price discrimination. Apr 19, 2014 - The consent agreement in this matter settles alleged violations of federal law prohibiting unfair methods of competition. Tucker, A Survey of Evidence Leading to Second Requests at the FTC, 78 Antitrust L.J. Nov 29, 2013 - Quantitative Techniques for Competition and Antitrust Analysis (repost). Apr 1, 2010 - The conference aims to discuss the recent developments in the empirical techniques - covering simple as well as most advanced and state-of-the-art quantitative techniques - and their practical application in competition casework and market studies/sector inquiries. Analytical tools and the Considers the various ways in which government attempts to alter business behavior through the use of industry regulation, antitrust legislation, and social regulation such as consumer protection, environmental protection, and occupational safety laws. Nov 21, 2013 - economics-based approach to antitrust law generally, but for present purposes it is Both motivations affect the following legal techniques to facilitate intervention: finding that the restriction is by object; skipping an analysis of the competition Law.4. The attached 1 The Merger Guidelines also contemplate a number of quantitative analyses to facilitate the analysis of potential unilateral effects including calculating diversion ratios and the value of diverted sales. A non-exhaustive list of High-quality competition analysis of antitrust cases envisages empirical analysis of market data within a robust theoretical framework, complemented with qualitative arguments. In the context of selective distribution, this shift had been already begun by the ECJ; in the leading case, Metro 1, the Court held that a simple selective distribution system would not infringe Article 101(1).5 This was crucial because,.